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Abstract 
The cycle of the Common Agricultural Policy reforms begun in 1992 and that finished, for the time being, in 
2013, profoundly transformed the agricultural framework of the EU. Taken as a whole, the process consisted of 
the progressive, partial and asymmetric liberalization of European agriculture, since much more emphasis was 
placed on dismantling intervention mechanisms than on aiding the restructuring, modernization and adaptation to 
a more competitive environment. In this context, and with an increasingly more open commercial policy, the 
States and the regions are obliged to design strategies to increase their competitiveness and innovation within the 
framework of the current Common Agricultural Policy (2014-2020). This is even more important for the regions 
most affected by the reforms. Under this argument, this paper reveals the principal qualitative and quantitative 
unknowns of the regional agricultural policy in Spain after the application of the Health Check in 2008, with 
special emphasis on the evolution of the Axis 1 of Rural Development.  
Keywords: agricultural support, Autonomous Communities, Common Agricultural Policy, competitiveness. 
JEL codes: Q1-H1. 
1. Introduction 
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was reformed in 2013. Although this reform was not very 
profound it opened up a new stage in the history of the CAP, since it broke definitively with the historical 
production and the instruments that incentivized production and distorted the markets. This transformation 
generated risks and opportunities (Compés & García, 2013), as well as a certain change in the mentality of the 
Member States (Atance, 2007). These risks are related to the traumatic changes in the sector that cause reduced 
activity and populations in certain regions (Compés & García, 2009). The opportunities include the challenges of 
sustainability, growth and competitiveness (Massot, 2013), since the reform has put more emphasis on 
deregulating the markets than on restructuring, modernizing and adapting to a more competitive environment, 
making manifest the structural weakness of the primary sector and the increasingly precarious situation of the 
smallest producers, with an impact in Spain that will be influenced by the wide differences among its regions.  
The key to the process lies essentially in the elimination of most of the market intervention measures and 
directing aid to the provision of public goods by the agricultural sector (Massot, 2013). The only measure with 
regard to the Common Organization of the Single Market was to incorporate the subject of the alimentary chain 
and tackle the problem of the weak market position of farmers by strengthening producers and inter-professional 
Organizations. The evolution of the second pillar was not so much to increase the incentives to farmers to make 
them more competitive, but to increase environmental protection measures and encourage diversity in rural areas. 
In this regard, the Member States (MS) and the Regions are obliged to design strategies to improve 
competitiveness and innovation within the framework of the CAP 2014-2020 (Buckwell, 2009) in an ever more 
open commercial environment.  
The boosting of competitiveness in agriculture is included in the European policy of Rural Development, with an 
Axis 1 of agricultural measures designed to encourage an agricultural model based on competitive, efficient and 
innovative holdings with higher added values under the control of young professional farmers (Atance, 2006). 
The Axis 1 aids are increasingly co-financed by national budgets (Cejudo & Maroto, 2010) and demand an effort 
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from those who request them, since the public contribution can reach as much as 40% of the investment (except 
for young farmers and residents in disadvantaged areas, who can receive a higher percentage), with the 
participation of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) of 21%. This element is 
crucial in considering these aids, which will be restricted by the scarcity of financial resources both in Europe, 
where demands are being made to reduce the agricultural budget (Massot, 2010), and even their renationalization 
(Castillo & Ramos, 2010), and in Spain, where the economic crisis has imposed severe cuts in public spending 
that have been applied unequally among the different regions and territories (Regidor & Troitiño, 2008).  
In this context, the questions that can be asked are the following: What is the situation of the different regions of 
Spanish agriculture in relation to the quantity and nature of public assistance received until 2013? In the ambit of 
agricultural competitiveness, what strategies have been followed in each of Spain’s Autonomous Communities 
(AC)? What is their economic impact within the framework of public aids and how was this affected by the 
CAP’s reforms?  
Due to their specialization in different products, the starting position of each AC is different, with appreciable 
differences in the levels of support provided by the CAP, the objectives and instruments. For example, price and 
market supports may still be important in AC “A”, as compared to the policy of budget transfers for rural 
development practiced in AC “B”, or that of decoupled aids in AC “C”. This situation of the decentralized 
application of agricultural policy is an obstacle to the rational planning of decisions and coordinated public 
actions if there is no previous mechanism in place of reliable information that allows the effects to be estimated 
and followed in each AC in order to correctly diagnose the origin of the problems that the public programs aim 
to solve, there already being in the literature previous cases of agricultural economy (Atance & Gómez-Limón, 
2004; Philippidis, 2005).  
In this context, and in line with the recommendations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), (the organization that has been most active, together with the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in dismantling price support instruments), the objective of the present work is to orient political decision 
making as to the strategies to be adopted in the different Spanish regional agricultural sectors as regards 
competitiveness, efficiency and innovation. For this, the initial situation of the individual ACs will be assessed, 
using the OECD’s advances in estimating agricultural support indicators as a methodological base in order to 
obtain the following specific goals:  
(1) To classify and quantify by regions public aid to Spanish agriculture during the period 2002-2012 by 
adapting the OECD’s method of calculating aid indicators. 
(2) Analyze the evolution of public aid to the regions into national and regional contributions. 
(3) Examine the evolution of Rural Development Axis 1, the measures included by regions and their economic 
impact.  
(4) Evaluate the scope of the policies that affect Spanish agricultural competitiveness.  
The first efforts aimed at estimating regional agricultural support were the works undertaken by the European 
Commission after the reforms of the nineties, with results for 1994 and 1996 (European Commission, 2001) and 
for 1991 and 1995 (Tarditi & Zanias, 2001). These used the concept of Producer Support Estimate introduced by 
the OECD (OECD, 2007), and also in the study by Zanias (2002) on calculating transfers in the MS. The 
European Spatial Planning Observation Network (2005) project analyzed the territorial impact of the CAP in 
1999 with continental products (i.e. non-Mediterranean) only and calculating the transfers of the “first pillar”. 
Other studies have analyzed transfers in countries with a federal administration, such as Switzerland 
(Walkenhorst, 2003), Germany (Anders et al., 2004; Hansen, 2005) and the USA (Sumner & Brunke, 2003). In 
Spain, the first study on public spending on agriculture in the ACs was by García et al. (1994). The Libro Blanco 
de la Agricultura y el Desarrollo Rural (MAPA, 2004) was a later work.  
The Spanish preoccupation with formulating the follow-up and evaluation of support was responsible for the 
development of a line of research based on the methodological contribution of the OECD for calculating 
agricultural support indicators. The most valuable contributions were the discussion of the calculation options of 
the Market Price Support (MPS) for products not included in the OECD’s estimations (Mediterranean products), 
testing an MSP that measured the percentage differences between domestic and international prices and 
measuring the customs duty with third countries (García & Andrés, 2007) and a comparison of the CAP transfers 
with the support for agriculture in other OECD countries (Andrés & García, 2010). An application following the 
WTO methodology can be found in Andrés and García (2016). In addition to the series on Analysis and 
Perspective by the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Food and the Environment (MAFE), in the ambit of 
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prospective studies the most important work was carried out by Blanco et al. (2011), which described potential 
scenarios of the single payment system and analyzed the redistribution effects of these scenarios by means of the 
CAPRI partial equilibrium model. Its results suggest that the convergence of direct aids would have a minimal 
impact at the EU level. However, its effects would be highly significant for certain regions and production 
systems, as in each MS the regions would benefit that historically have received the lowest average payments per 
hectare, and between States there would be a transfer of funds from the EU-15 to the EU-12. Other studies on the 
overall European situation have reached similar conclusions (Velázquez, 2008; Zahrnt, 2009; Erjavec et al., 2011; 
Gocht et al., 2011). 
The debate on the competitiveness of agriculture and the evaluation of its regional component has recently been 
revived. Studies have been published on European agriculture (Hermans et al., 2010), at the national level 
(Czyzewski & Stepien, 2011; Popov, 2012; Aggelopoulos et al., 2014), and others on a local level (Fragoso et al., 
2011; Cofas & Toma, 2014; Zasada & Piorr, 2015). In general, this line of research concludes that the CAP’s 
rural development policies to boost competitiveness have important local effects in their application and in the 
distribution of funds and that it is becoming essential to promote structural strategies to stimulate the economic 
competitiveness of holdings in order to increase incomes and rural employment and reduce the long-term 
tendency to disinvestment and to promote new agricultural and non-agricultural activities in the least competitive 
zones (Note 1). 
2. Materials and Methods 
Measures of the support to agriculture are included in the OECD’s annual publication Agricultural Policies in 
OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation (2016) (Note 2). The OECD’s method consists of calculating and 
interpreting a wide range of indicators based on the concepts of Producer Support Estimate (PSE), General 
Services Support Estimate (GSSE) and Total Support Estimate (TSE). The PSE Manual (Note 3) contains a 
detailed explanation of the concepts, calculation, interpretation and use of each indicator, including how to 
identify, distinguish and classify the policies and estimate the quantities of the transfers they generate. The 
statistical series of each member state (the EU is considered as a unit), plus Brazil, Chile, China, the Russian 
Federation, South Africa and The Ukraine are included in the OECD Database 1986-2015 (Note 4), to 
complement their annual report.  
PSE is an indicator adopted by the OECD to measure support to agriculture: the annual monetary value of gross 
transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm-gate level, arising from 
policy measures that support agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or 
income. In order to be able to compare support levels in different countries or regions, the PSE is normally 
expressed as a ratio based on the gross value of the producer's income (%PSE: PSE as a share of gross farm 
receipts, including support). The PSE is calculated for individual products and can be added for the purposes of 
obtaining a national or regional PSE. It is important to note that the emphasis of the PSE lies not only in its total 
amount, but also in its evolution and distribution among the different support instruments, whose degree of 
market distortion is variable. There are forms of aid that distort international trade more than others (Blandford, 
2005). In general, it tends to accept that transfers through prices imply a greater degree of distortion. The OECD 
methodology makes it possible to classify support by type, considering on the one hand transfers derived from 
price interventions and, on the other hand, transfer groups related to disbursements or direct payments to 
producers. Thus, the PSE includes two types of transfers: a) those that keep domestic prices to the highest (and 
occasionally lower) producers of the world, forming the component called Market Price Support (MPS); and b) 
those that provide payments to producers, based on criteria such as the volume produced, the amount of inputs 
used, the number of animals, the area cultivated or the income received, forming the component called budget 
transfers.  
The OECD also considers the GSSE, the annual monetary value of gross transfers arising from policy measures 
that create enabling conditions for the primary agricultural sector through development of private or public 
services, and through institutions and infrastructures regardless of their objectives and impacts on farm 
production and income, or consumption of farm products. It includes policies where primary agriculture is the 
main beneficiary, but does not include any payments to individual producers. GSSE transfers do not directly alter 
producer receipts, costs or consumption expenditures (%GSSE: GSSE as a share of TSE). Based on the above 
indicators, the OECD obtains the TSE; this is an indicator of the annual monetary value of all gross transfers 
from taxpayers and consumers arising from policy measures that support agriculture, net of associated budgetary 
receipts, regardless of their objectives and impacts on farm production and income, or consumption of farm 
products. The TSE is the sum of transfers or payments to producers (PSE), structural actions (GSSE) and 
transfers or payments of taxpayers to consumers (direct subsidy to the first consumer). The percentage TSE 
jas.ccsenet.org Journal of Agricultural Science Vol. 9, No. 6; 2017 
4 
(%TSE) expresses general support as a percentage of GDP. Table 1 gives a breakdown of the indicators 
according to the type of aid they contain, including an algebraic detail about their calculation methodology. For 
more information, readers can consult the PSE Manual (Note 3). 
 
Table 1. Support categories from the OECD indicators 
A. Support based on commodity output 
A.1. Market Price Support (MPS) 
A.2. Payments based on output 
B. Payments based on input use 
B.1. Use of variable inputs 
B.2. Formation of fixed capital  
B.3. Agricultural services 
C. Payments based on current A/An/R/I*, production required 
C.1. Of a single product 
C.2. Of a product group 
C.3. Of all products 
D. Payments based on non-current A/An/R/I*, production required 
E. Payments based on non-current A/An/R/I*, production not required 
E.1. Variable rates 
E.2. Fixed rates 
F. Payments based on non-commodity criteria 
F.1. Withdrawall of long-term resources 
F.2. Production of non-tradables 
F.3. Other different product criteria 
G. Miscellaneous 
PSE = ∑(categories A-G) 
H. Research and development 
I. Agricultural schools 
J. Inspection services 
K. Infrastructure 
L. Marketing and promotion 
M. Public stockholding 
N. Miscellaneous 
GSSE = ∑(categories H-N) 
O. Transfers to the first consumer 
TSE = PSE + GSSE + O 
Note. * The letters stand for Area (A), Animal Numbers (AN), Receipts (R) or Income (I). 
Source: Compiled by the authors from PSE Manual. 
 
The present study calculated the OECD indicators for the period 2002-2013 for Spain and each of its ACs, 
according to the origin of the transfers (Spanish or European). In this way:  
 TOTAL TSE = NATIONAL TSE + CAP TSE 
 TOTAL PSE = NATIONAL PSE + CAP PSE 
 TOTAL GSSE = NATIONAL GSSE + CAP GSSE 
In calculating Spanish transfers, the budgetary transfers were obtained from information from the Subdirección 
General de Relaciones Internacionales y Asuntos Comunitarios of the MAFE, which gives the figures for state 
and AC transfers for the period 2005-2013. The co-financed measures of rural development for the period 
2007-2013 (Note 5) were taken from the Rural Development Programs financed by the EAFRD for each AC 
(national figure). To calculate CAP support by regions, the figures for the transfers were taken from the Reports 
on the Activities of the Spanish Agricultural Guarantee Fund, which contain the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund-Guarantee and European Agricultural Guarantee Fund to the ACs. Between 2002 and 2006 
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the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund-Guidance (Note 6) transfers were incorporated, as well 
as the agricultural transfers of the Regional Operative Programs for 2000-2006, basically associated with the 
financing of structural actions (Note 7) in the sector. From 2007, rural development measures were taken from 
the Rural Development Programs financed by the EAFRD for each AC (EAFRD figures), plus agricultural 
transfers from the Regional Operative Programs for 2007-2013 (Note 8). 
3. Results 
3.1 The Size of Public Support for Spanish Agriculture 
The support to Spanish agriculture is mainly concentrated on Andalusia, Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla & León, 
Catalonia and Aragón, regions with large agricultural sectors (as determined by their Productin figures (PRA), 
Useful Tillage Surface (SAU) and Agricultural Work Units (UTA)). Except for Catalonia, their PRA contributes 
a large percentage to the regional GDP (Note 9). Their evolution shows a clear tendency towards reduced 
activities for reasons that will be explained in the subsequent sections of this paper. As can be seen in Table 2, 
the total support received by each AC (TOTAL TSE) is the sum of transfers from within Spain (TSE 
NATIONAL) and the EU (TSE CAP).  
 
Table 2. Estimated total support (TOTAL TSE) by AC (€million) 
 
MEAN ANNUAL 2006-2009 MEAN ANNUAL 2010-2013 
CAP MID-TERM REVIEW CAP HEALTH CHECK 
NATIONAL TSE CAP TSE TOTAL TSE NATIONAL TSE CAP TSE TOTAL TSE 
GALICIA 78.2 488.7 566.9 92.0 441.8 533.8 
ASTURIAS (P. de) 22.7 153.7 176.3 22.6 127.7 150.3 
CANTABRIA 21.9 84.0 105.9 17.9 72.2 90.0 
BASQUE COUNTRY 13.3 118.0 131.4 21.7 89.5 111.2 
NAVARRA (C.F. de) 46.1 213.2 259.3 35.3 173.0 208.3 
LA RIOJA 35.9 92.1 128.0 20.2 67.7 87.8 
ARAGÓN 112.7 796.2 908.9 75.8 628.6 704.4 
CATALONIA 124.5 823.9 948.4 97.8 586.4 684.2 
BALEARIC (Islands) 11.0 71.8 82.8 8.4 43.4 51.8 
CASTILLA & LEÓN 193.3 1546.6 1739.8 164.6 1282.6 1447.1 
MADRID (Com.) 10.2 146.5 156.6 9.2 82.0 91.2 
CASTILLA LA MANCHA 164.7 1189.5 1354.2 94.5 1042.9 1137.4 
VALENCIA 88.8 538.8 627.5 76.4 371.5 447.8 
MURCIA (R. de) 26.7 300.8 327.5 33.0 228.0 261.1 
EXTREMADURA 65.3 802.7 867.9 61.6 704.3 765.9 
ANDALUSIA 202.2 2810.5 3012.6 155.2 2313.6 2468.9 
CANARY (Islands) 15.8 262.7 278.4 21.6 322.7 344.3 
TOTAL SPAIN 1,233.0 10,439.3 11,672.2 1,007.7 8,577.7 9,585.4 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
3.1.1 Transfers from Spain: Composition and Characteristics 
The transfers from inside Spain include the co-financing of rural development measures and transfers from the 
central government in Madrid and those from the regional governments. These transfers do not include 
production-based payments (PSE Category A) and most of them are structural measures (GSSE) when compared 
with the EU transfers (8% of state aids, 34% of co-financed rural development and over 50% of regional aids). 
These figures reveal the role of state aid as a supplement to the financing of services provided to the agricultural 
sector in general. As the rural development measures are co-financed, they are mostly given to individual 
holdings as provided by the CAP, especially in the PSE categories B, C and F (setting up young farmers, 
investments in agriculture and modernization, training and advising, agri-environmental aid, aid to 
disadvantaged areas, conversion of agricultural land to forests, etc.). Also important are the aids to developing 
infrastructures within the GSSE in Categories K and N. An even higher percentage of the state aids are provided 
to individual producers and are concentrated in PSE Category B on financing the use of variable inputs (aids to 
agricultural insurance) and fixed inputs (e.g. machinery renewals and stock-breeding). The small proportion 
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dedicated to general services supports promotion and marketing activities, pest control, and aids to Sanitary 
Defense Groups (Categories L and N). The aids from the regional governments are given to individual producers 
in PSE Categories B and G (aids to insurance and fuel, modernization, sustainable production, acquiring land 
and machinery, bee-keeping, stock-breeding, compensation for adverse weather, etc.). A large amount is 
concentrated in general services through developing infrastructures, promotion and marketing and health 
measures (Categories K, L and N).  
Figure 1 shows the composition of support from within Spain by the origin of the transfers. The biggest 
contribution to the NATIONAL TSE, almost 50%, is from co-financed rural development, followed by state 
transfers, with an average weight of 35%, while regional support is only 15%. The NATIONAL PSE is 
composed of co-financed rural development (45%) and state transfers (45%), regional support (10%). 
NATIONAL GSSE is formed by co-financed rural development (61%), regional transfers (29%), while the state 
contribution is 10%.  
 
 
Figure 1. Composition of national aids. Average 2005-2013 (€ million) 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
Table 3. Principal indicators of the OECD in Spain (€ million) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
PSEcap 10 887.48 9,730.05 9,299.77 9,220.46 8,992.98 8,088.83 7,503.59 8,231.15 8,117.95
PSEnational 807.60 917.47 679.98 898.85 952.49 892.37 797.03 731.00 570.60 
TOTAL PSE 11 695.08 10 647.52 9,979.75 10 119.31 9,945.47 8,981.20 8,300.62 8,962.15 8,688.56
% PSEcap 27.49 26.17 21.89 22.17 23.70 20.04 18.32 19.51 18.34 
% PSEnational 2.04 2.47 1.60 2.16 2.51 2.21 1.95 1.73 1.29 
% TOTAL PSEe 29.53 28.64 23.49 24.33 26.21 22.25 20.26 21.24 19.63 
GSSEcap 1,553.65 1,543.17 269.80 410.56 436.69 453.06 513.49 466.77 360.41 
GSSEnational 292.50 453.31 236.80 337.19 411.32 361.26 322.60 212.75 142.51 
TOTAL GSSEe 1,846.15 1,996.47 506.60 747.74 848.01 814.33 836.09 679.51 502.92 
% GSSEcap 11.71 13.00 2.68 4.09 4.46 5.08 6.31 5.33 4.24 
% GSSEnational 26.58 32.80 25.68 26.98 29.85 28.80 28.81 22.54 19.98 
% TOTAL GSSEe 12.85 15.07 4.61 6.62 7.60 8.00 9.03 7.00 5.46 
TSEcap 13 266.61 11 868.37 10 067.07 10 039.67 9,781.96 8,918.53 8,141.35 8,758.59 8,492.27
TSEnational 1,100.30 1,381.94 922.16 1,249.99 1,377.76 1,254.29 1,119.63 943.74 713.11 
TOTAL TSEe 14 366.91 13 250.32 10 989.22 11 289.66 11 159.72 10 172.82 9,260.98 9,702.33 9,205.38
% TSEcap 1.46 1.20 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.85 0.78 0.85 0.83 
% TSEnational 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.09 0,07 
% TOTAL TSEe 1.58 1.34 1.04 1.04 1.07 0.97 0.89 0.94 0.90 
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Table 3 shows a comparison between the national and European transfers (see Section 3.1.2). Of the total support 
received by the Spanish producer (TOTAL PSE), 8.3% is from the Spanish government. TOTAL PSE was 
€8,700m in 2013, a reduction of 26% over 2005, or 20% of the producers’ incomes, (the average of the EU and 
the OECD).(Note 10) State support was increased to 36% when considering total support to general services 
(TOTAL GSSE). Total GSSE represents 8.5% of total support (very much lower than the average EU and OECD 
values). In short, Spain and its Autonomous Communities finance approximately 10% of the total support to 
agriculture (TOTAL TSE), which has gone down by 36% in nine years. This was €9,200m in 2013, or 0.9% of 
GDP (somewhat higher than in the EU and OECD). 
3.1.2 Who Finances the EU Transfers? 
Table 4 shows that Spain received an annual average of €11 100m in CAP TSE between 2002 and 2013. The 
CAP contributions can be seen to fall from €14 300m in 2002 to €8,500m in 2013. The measures in which these 
CAP transfers were made will be given below (general service and producer support). 
 



















TSE PAC  TSE PAC TSE PAC 
GALICIA 798.8  488.7 441.8 576.4 5.2 56.5 
ASTURIAS (P. de) 245.7  153.7 127.7 175.7 1.6 43.5 
CANTABRIA 149.8  84.0 72.2 102 0.9 51.4 
BASQUE COUNTRY 192.3  118.0 89.5 133.3 1.2 46.6 
NAVARRA (C.F. de) 294.9  213.2 173.0 227 2 55.3 
LA RIOJA 134.2  92.1 67.7 98 0.9 52.6 
ARAGÓN 1,122.4  796.2 628.6 849.1 7.6 58.7 
CATALONIA 1,242.1  823.9 587.2 884.4 8 50 
BALEARIC (Islands) 110.9  71.8 43.4 75.3 0.7 41 
CASTILLA & LEÓN 2,212.1  1,546.6 1,282.6 1,680.40 15.1 59.2 
MADRID (Com.) 201.5  146.5 82.0 143.3 1.3 36.2 
CASTILLA LA MANCHA 1,425.5  1,189.5 1,047.2 1,220.70 11 67.7 
VALENCIA 795.8  538.8 371.5 568.7 5.1 49.2 
MURCIA (R. de) 464.4  300.8 228.0 331.1 3 58 
EXTREMADURA 896.2  802.7 704.3 801 7.2 77.5 
ANDALUSIA 3,703.4  2,810.5 2,313.6 2,942.50 26.5 55.6 
CANARY (Islands) 295.6  262.7 322.7 293.6 2.6 112.7 
TOTAL SPAIN 14 285.2  10 439.3 8,577.7 11 102.4 100 58.6 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
The concentration of total support in Andalusia, Castilla & León, Castilla-La Mancha, Catalonia, Aragón and 
Extremadura shows the relatively higher support to the sub-sectors: sheep and goat rearing, beef cattle, wine, 
cereals and olive oil, with differences between the continental agricultural regions (highly subsidized) and the 
fruit and vegetable regions. Spanish agriculture is undoubtedly diverse and complex. Its geographical size, 
topography and climatic variations imply considerable differences in the production of the different regions. 
These differences can be seen in Table 4 in the territorial distribution of total CAP support. Another fundamental 
difference between the ACs lies in the way support is provided, with important production-based payments in 
specialized regions (dairy products in Galicia, and fruit and vegetables in the Mediterranean areas) while in other 
regions most support is given in the form of direct payments not related to production (Andalusia, Aragón, both 
Castillas and Extremadura). 
The growth of GDP and the reduced total support in nominal terms have led to a significant drop in CAP TSE as 
a percentage of GDP (from 1.99% to 0.83%), still above the EU and OECD average (0.75%) (Note 11). 
Extremadura and both Castillas receive the relatively high values of over 3%, while Asturias, Cantabria, The 
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Basque Country, Catalonia, Valencia and Madrid the figure does not reach 1%, as can be seen in Map 1, in which 
the Mediterranean Regions and Cantabria show lower CAP TSE values than the south and central mainland.  
 
 
Map 1. Estimated total support per AC: % of GDP (average 2002-2013) 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
(1) Transfers for Support to General Services and the Loss of EU Co-Financing 
The General Services Support to Agriculture from CAP transfers, shown in Table 5, was €360m in 2013. Five 
ACs received almost 60% of the CAP GSSE: Andalusia (18.0%), Castilla & León (12.7%), Castilla-La Mancha 
(9.3%), Galicia (8.9%) and The Canary islands (8.5%). The northern ACs (Asturias, Cantabria, Basque Country, 
La Rioja) while Madrid received a little over 1%. In 2007-2013 the most important CAP GSSE measures: aids to 
added value of agriculture and forestry products and aids to infrastructures for the development and adaptation 
of agriculture and forestry (Category K) were significant in Andalusia, both Castillas, Extremadura and The 
Canaries. Measures for early retirement and for business creation and development (Category K) had 
considerable weight in Galicia. Promotion of wines and spirits were important in the traditional wine-producing 
regions such as Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla & León, La Rioja and Galicia. In fruit and vegetable growing 
regions such as Andalusia and Valencia, aids to Operating Funds of Producers’ Organizations headed the list. 
The CAP GSSE and its tendency to fall, shown in Table 5, are influenced by two factors. In the period 2007-2013, 
six regions no longer fulfilled the conditions of Objective 1, which involved reductions in their structural 
transfers. In this framework, Andalucía, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura and Galicia remained in the 
Convergence Objective; Asturias, Murcia, Castilla & León, Valencia and The Canaries entered the Phasing-Out 
and Phasing-In Objectives; and Aragón, The Balearics, Cantabria, Catalonia, Madrid, Navarra, The Basque 
Country and La Rioja remained in the Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective. Table 5 shows the 
financial breakdown of these events, as well as the elimination of the Operative Programs in force until 2006, 
whose funds are included in the CAP GSSE in the present study. However, since 2007 only the structural 
measures financed by the EAGF and EAFRD are included, as can be seen in Figure 2. In the last seven years of 
this period, the CAP GSSE rose from €270m to more than €510m in 2011, but in the last two years of the Health 
Check (2012 and 2013), when the economic crisis reached a peak, this figure was reduced by 30% to the €360m 
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GSSE PAC  GSSE PAC GSSE PAC 
GALICIA 158.3  53.8 28.7 80.3 8.9 8 
ASTURIAS (P. de) 43.3  25.7 13.6 27.5 3.1 12.7 
CANTABRIA 19.8  6.1 5.4 10.4 1.2 11.6 
BASQUE COUNTRY 21.3  7.1 7.2 11.9 1.3 39.5 
NAVARRA (C.F. de) 29.5  12.0 11.2 17.6 1.9 27.3 
LA RIOJA 17.1  7.3 8.7 11 1.2 60.5 
ARAGÓN 108.4  42.2 22.3 57.6 6.4 15.6 
CATALONIA 88.1  43.5 28.8 53.5 5.9 36.8 
BALEARIC (Islands) 12.8  4.1 1.2 6 0.7 6.4 
CASTILLA & LEÓN 236.9  68.8 36.6 114.1 12.7 14.8 
MADRID (Com.) 24.3  7.4 3.6 11.7 1.3 11.4 
CASTILLA LA MANCHA 159.4  56.8 34.5 83.5 9.3 16.3 
VALENCIA 94.8  53.4 40.2 62.8 7 36.8 
MURCIA (R. de) 66.9  50.1 50.6 55.9 6.2 75.4 
EXTREMADURA 105.7  34.1 36.7 58.8 6.5 30.2 
ANDALUSIA 273.4  106.3 107.8 162.5 18 27.1 
CANARY (Islands) 132.4  86.5 11.7 76.8 8.5 3.7 
TOTAL SPAIN 1,592.2  665.1 448.5 901.9 100 22.1 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
Map 2 shows the percentage CAP GSSE, which in Spain was around 4% in 2013, quite different from the 
European and OECD averages (10.7 and 12.69%, respectively).(Note 12) The lower European values point out 
the need to provide the second pillar of the CAP with more funds.              
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of% GSSE (2002-2013) 
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Map 2. Estimated support to general services per AC: % CAP TSE (average 2002-2013) 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
(2) Estimated Support to Producers and the Challenge to European Agricultural Reform 
The CAP PSE indicator is shown in Table 6, in which the annual average figure is €9,700m for the period. The 
reduction of aids to producers is quite clear, i.e. 33% between 2002 and 2013. The CAP PSE can be seen to be 
concentrated in four ACs: Andalusia (27.42%), Castilla & León (15.96%), Castilla-La Mancha (10.49%) and 
Catalonia (8.13%). Apart from The Canaries, all the regions have lost CAP PSE to varying degrees. Those that 
lost least were Extremadura (8.11%) and Castilla-La Mancha (16.77%). Category B measures, such as 
restructuring and reconversion of vineyards, and the Category C, such as the suckler cow premium and 
agri-environmental aids remained stable at high values in these regions, and the single payment of the Mid-Term 
Reform entered strongly. The north of Spain (Asturias, The Basque Country and La Rioja) and Madrid were at 
the other extreme, and lost 50% due to the drop in production-based aids (Category A), premiums for stock 
rearing and aids for cereals (Category C), aids to modernizing holdings and investments in holdings (Category 
B). In The Canaries, the support given to producers doubled with respect to the 2002 figure, which was due to 
this region being a peripheral EU zone and receiving funds from the Program of Specific Options for the Canary 
Islands (POSEICAN) (Note 13). 
The% CAP PSE was 18.4% in 2013, quite similar to that of the OECD (18.2%) but somewhat lower than the EU 
average (19.8%) (Note 14). Map 3 shows the percentage income of producers from CAP transfers: in Murcia and 
La Rioja it is below 15%, while Asturias, Cantabria, Extremadura and Madrid are the leaders with figures over 
30%. These differences are due to each of the regions specializing in different products and the fact that the 
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 PSE PAC  PSE PAC PSE PAC 
GALICIA 628.6  433.1 412.9 491.5 5.1 70.1 
ASTURIAS (P. de) 199.5  127.2 114.1 146.9 1.5 50.8 
CANTABRIA 129.0  77.8 66.8 91.2 0.9 57.5 
BASQUE COUNTRY 169.5  110.0 81.8 120.4 1.2 48 
NAVARRA (C.F. de) 252.4  189.3 156.5 199.4 2 61.1 
LA RIOJA 114.1  82.6 57.5 84.7 0.9 52 
ARAGÓN 940.8  706.7 584.3 743.9 7.6 68.9 
CATALONIA 1082.0  743.3 546.6 790.7 8.1 54.8 
BALEARIC (Islands) 97.7  67.4 42.1 69.1 0.7 45.9 
CASTILLA & LEÓN 1,961.4  1,461.7 1,234.9 1,552.6 16 64.8 
MADRID (Com.) 174.6  137.7 77.8 130 1.3 39.2 
CASTILLA LA MANCHA 1,100.1  987.7 973.1 1,020.3 10.5 83.2 
VALENCIA 639.3  423.0 316.4 459.5 4.7 56 
MURCIA (R. de) 370.8  226.7 174.3 257.2 2.6 59.9 
EXTREMADURA 714.2  729.7 655.7 699.9 7.2 91.9 
ANDALUSIA 3,153.1  2,655.5 2,191.8 2,666.8 27.4 62.5 
CANARY (Islands) 150.0  151.5 304.2 201.9 2.1 214.9 
TOTAL SPAIN 11 876.8  9,310.8 7,990.3 9,726 100 67.1 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
 
Map 3. Estimated producer support by AC: percentage of producers’ income (average 2002-2013) 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
In Figure 3 the composition of the CAP PSE is broken down by types of measure and an evaluation is made of 
the impact of the measures introduced in the Mid-Term Reform, especially the reduction of production-based 
payments and their gradual replacement by decoupled payments (single payments). Figure 3 shows the pillars on 
which the reform was based: a sharp drop in production-based payments (Category A), reduced payments per 
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Figure 3. Percentage change in the principal CAP PSE categories in Spain 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
In 2002 almost 70% of the CAP PSE consisted of production-based support and most of it was granted through 
prices, which is the decoupled-zero reference. After 2006 and the introduction of the single payment by the 
Mid-term Reform, the situation began to change. In that year the value of Category A fell to 52% (though still 
high due to the predominance of frontier-protection measures in the dairy and vegetable sectors, the maintenance 
of internal prices in products such as rice and dairy derivatives, and the predominance of direct payments to 
production in the Mediterranean sectors such as oil and wine, tobacco and cattle) while decoupled payments 
reached a value of 23%. One decade later, Category A had been reduced to 43%. However, this form of price and 
production support is still in force due to import duties, which are still the main protection in most OECD 
countries and explain the persistence of domestic prices higher than the world average (Note 15). The CAP PSE 
Category C, direct payments per hectare and head of cattle, created in 1992, and currently replaced by “green 
box” decoupled payments, reached a maximum in 2005 at 28.4%. However, four years later it had fallen to 
10.4%. The reductions in Categories A and C were compensated for by the single payment (Category E), which 
represented 54.4% of the CAP PSE in 2012 (it did not exist eight years previously).  
The different starting points and the different production specialties of the territories gave rise to a series of 
changes of varying intensity, which allows one to speculate that the rate of adaptation to the reform of 
agricultural policies is faster in some regions than others, i.e. the different effects of the Mid-Term Reform and 
the Health Check. The greatest impact was in Aragón, both Castillas, Andalusia and Extremadura, due to the 
reduced weight of production-based support, compensated by higher percentages of direct payments per hectare 
and head of cattle or in a single payment for specializing in cereals, stock breeding or olive oil. Navarra and 
Asturias are closest to the average Spanish evolution and maintain their production-based support around 30%. 
The weakest impact was found in Galicia, Madrid and the Mediterranean coast, where the specialization in milk 
and vegetables keeps their production-based support above 40%.  
(i) Market Price Support (MPS) and Rising World Prices 
It can be seen in Table 7 that the reduction in CAP PSE was due to the reduction in MPS, which, with an annual 
average of €4,000m was reduced by 66% after 2002 (60% in Europe) (Note 16). The drastic evolution of MPS 
was due not only to the change in the CAP model after 1992 but also to higher world prices. MPS is concentrated 
in the large production regions of Andalusia, Castilla & León, Catalonia and Aragón, and in the fruit and 
vegetable producing regions of Valencia and Murcia and in milk-producing Galicia. Even though the drop in 
MPS is inexorable in all regions, it still survives due to the predominance of protective customs duties in the fruit 
and vegetable and dairy sectors, the price maintenance of rice and dairy products and to the Mediterranean 
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(%) AGENDA 2000 
CAP MID-TERM 
REVIEW 
CAP HEALTH  
CHECK 
MPS MPS MPS 
GALICIA 476.5 238.9 172.0 259.8 7.2 
ASTURIAS (P. de) 136.5 52.3 26.5 71.7 1,8 
CANTABRIA 91.9 30.7 18.6 47 1.2 
BASQUE COUNTRY 117.0 57.4 26.5 67 1.6 
NAVARRA (C.F. de) 143.4 81.2 43.5 89.4 2.2 
LA RIOJA 80.1 43.1 20.0 47.7 1.2 
ARAGÓN 525.6 258.1 127.3 303.6 7.4 
CATALONIA 806.6 459.2 222.8 496.2 12.1 
BALEARIC (Islands) 69.1 38.2 14.3 40.5 1 
CASTILLA & LEÓN 1021.2 462.5 229.7 571.1 14 
MADRID (Com.) 138.0 89.9 34.7 87.5 2.1 
CASTILLA LA MANCHA 382.0 208.3 98.7 229.6 5.6 
VALENCIA 543.3 332.4 173.3 349.6 8.6 
MURCIA (R. de) 305.0 165.1 88.8 186.3 4.6 
EXTREMADURA 166.3 147.4 86.1 133.2 3.3 
ANDALUSIA 1656.8 905.4 435.0 999 24.5 
CANARY (Islands) 111.5 61.1 38.2 70.2 1.7 
TOTAL SPAIN 6,770.6 3,630.8 1,855.9 4,085.8 100 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
3.2 A Small Boost to Agricultural Competitiveness 
Support for competitiveness is included in the European Rural Development policy, with an Axis 1 of structural 
measures designed to promote a model of agriculture based on competitive, efficient and innovative holdings. 
The analysis of the Spanish competitive model reveals serious weaknesses. As can be seen in Table 8, the mean 
value of the EAFRD Axis 1 was €600m annually, or 45% of the support to Rural Development (Note 17). In 
spite of growing by 350% between 2007 and 2013, it was only equal to 80% of the total support to Spain from 
the CAP TSE in 2013, figures that show the weakness of the intervention in terms of competitiveness. On a 
regional scale, the comparison reveals considerable differences in strategies. In general, the distribution of Axis 1 
funds is concentrated in the ACs with the highest levels of public support to agriculture: Castilla & León, 
Andalusia, Galicia, Castilla-La Mancha, Catalonia and Aragón, which receive between 9.5 and 15%. At the other 
extreme, Madrid, Cantabria, The Balearics, La Rioja and The Basque Country receive less than 2.2%. However, 
if the percentage of total CAP support destined to promote competitiveness is considered, the leaders are La 
Rioja, The Balearics, The Basque Country, Galicia, Catalonia and Extremadura, with percentages between 12 
and 20%.  
When the amount of Axis 1 is divided according to its origin (see Figure 4) it can be seen that the funds provided 
by the EAFRD have risen continuously since 2007, with a slowdown between 2010 and 2012 due to the world 
economic crisis. However, the ever tighter Spanish budgets, hit hard by the crisis, have put the co-financing of 
the support to competitiveness in serious danger, precisely at a time in history when a more efficient use of funds 
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Table 8. Regional Axis 1 (EAFRD + national co-financing) (€million) 
 





2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GALICIA 13.1 21.8 78.1 106.2 93.7 62.8 76.6 64.6 10.7 17.1 
ASTURIAS (P. de) 18.7 16.6 25.1 64 17.5 24.7 11 25.4 4.2 9.9 
CANTABRIA 3.5 3.5 4.5 6.4 12.2 9.2 9.7 7 1.2 11.9 
BASQUE COUNTRY 0 10.1 7.4 11.8 23.8 20 17.8 13 2.2 18.7 
NAVARRA (C.F. de) 21.1 26.4 25.7 35.2 33 37.4 15 27.7 4.6 9.3 
LA RIOJA 7.3 7.1 18.7 14.5 16.4 11.3 14.7 12.9 2.1 19.8 
ARAGÓN 30.5 84.4 98.9 50.4 58.8 40.8 34.4 56.9 9.5 5.3 
CATALONIA 39.5 68.6 80.9 43.8 60.8 47.3 72.2 59 9.8 12.0 
BALEARIC (Islands) 2.8 3.1 9.1 7.7 0.5 10.1 9 6 1 19.7 
CASTILLA & LEÓN 34.9 57.3 133.4 126.5 104 84.4 104 92 15.3 7.9 
MADRID (Com.) 0 1.1 7.4 3 5.8 3.9 5.8 3.9 0.6 6.8 
CASTILLA LA MANCHA 11 34.6 110.7 95.3 83.6 49.3 59.1 63.3 10.5 6.0 
VALENCIA 9.8 27.9 31.5 32.8 38.2 10.5 26.9 25.4 4.2 7.0 
MURCIA (R. de) 0 4.8 30 26.8 19.6 21.3 21.1 17.7 2.9 8.1 
EXTREMADURA 0 0 39.1 52.3 61.5 55.8 80 41.3 6.9 11.9 
ANDALUSIA 0.6 12 22.3 88.3 86.8 148.3 123.1 68.8 11.4 5.6 
CANARY (Islands) 0 0 18 21.5 43 15.8 20.1 16.9 2.8 5.9 
TOTAL SPAIN 193 379 741 787 759 653 701 601.7 100 8.2 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
 
Figure 4. Evolution of Axis 1, EAFRD contribution and Spanish co-financing (€million) 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
4. Discussion 
The intense reform of the CAP has meant a profound change in the model of support to European agriculture. 
There is no doubt that the transfers to agriculture by the EU are being increasingly decoupled from production, to 
ensure their compatibility with the multilateral system of commercial rules. This modification of the financing 
paradigm began in 1992 with the MacSharry Reform, continued with the Agenda 2000 and was consolidated by 
the decisions taken in the Mid-Term Review of 2003. The 2009 Health Check fortified the 2003 Reform by 
further decoupling aids and limiting specific aids and by demanding greater responsibility from farmers.   
The results obtained in this study for the different Spanish regions by calculating the agricultural support 
indicators backed by the OECD (PSE, GSSE and TSE) show that the steps in the reform of the CAP up to the 
single payment in 2003 have not involved significant changes apart from the dismantling of the market 
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transfers, whose apparent reduction is no more than the reflection of the rise in world prices, and in their 
territorial distribution. This latter aspect is highly unequal in Spain due to the development of the CAP itself, the 
diversity of products and the use of historic references to fix the value of decoupled payments to holdings. Thus, 
this work calculates the annual average CAP transfer to Spain since 2002 as €11 100m (€8,500m in 2013), with 
most of the aid going to Andalusia, Castilla & León, Castilla-La Mancha and Catalonia, due to the greater 
relative weight of CAP support to the stock-rearing, cattle, wine, cereals and olive oil sub-sectors. This 
highlights the difference between the (highly subsidized) continental agriculture regions and the fruit and 
vegetable growing regions, which do not receive the same volume of transfers, and include the dairy regions, 
which are tied to market-price support. When the Spanish contribution is included, the figures rise by a little over 
10%.   
As regards the total value of the aids received, this study has shown that the €600m spent annually on incentives 
to make holdings more competitive (less than 5% of total public support) is insufficient and leaves Spanish 
producers in a precarious position, especially the smallest. Of the annual €600m, the Spanish contribution to 
co-financing is in serious danger, as are the aids in other areas, due to the sharp cuts in public spending caused 
by the economic crisis and the fact that other areas have been given higher priority. Also, their distribution by 
regions is very unequal and reveals the wide differences in the strategies of the different autonomous 
communities. La Rioja, The Balearics, The Basque Country, Galicia, Catalonia and Extremadura encourage 
competitiveness by assigning between 12 and 20% of their available funds to this end.  
From the above it can be seen that not enough is being done in Spain to promote competitiveness. There is no 
doubt that direct payments make up the bulk of the CAP, due to their budgetary importance (over two thirds of 
the agricultural funds) and they have always been at the center of attention in debates on the CAP. The figures 
cited in this paper are aimed at stimulating the political debate on competitiveness, since in the authors’ opinion 
it is one of the biggest challenges to the rural development policies.  
This work has shown that until 2013 agricultural transfers in Spain have depended on the historic CAP support 
model and have had little to do with remunerating farmers for the public service they provide, or with 
restructuring, modernizing and adapting to a more competitive environment. It would appear that the new CAP 
2014-2020, which includes environmental objectives in direct payments, is the beginning of the end of the status 
quo and historical references. As always, Spain has again opted for reducing to the minimum the wide 
differences in the size of the payments to its farmers. Spanish agriculture now faces the need to adapt itself to a 
difficult and ever-changing international situation. The CAP 2014-2020 Rural Development programs provide 
the basis for implementing the necessary investment on a regional scale, to modernize holdings in order to boost 
production and improve environmental aspects, increase incomes, employment, standards of living, the 
economic and social cohesion of rural communities, and put an end to the long-term tendency of disinvestment 
that limits rural development. The national, regional and local administrations have a responsibility to plan 
alternative economic strategies for the different territories and provide them with sufficient funds for their needs, 
in our opinion a crucial issue.  
Future lines of research will go deeper into the results obtained in the present study. The new CAP 2014-2020 
direct payments system, which came into force in 2015, needs further analysis from the regional perspective 
(basic, green, young farmers, coupled direct payments, aids to naturally disadvantaged zones, and redistributive 
payments). Bearing in mind that Spain has opted for a national model that does not include redistributive 
payments or aids to disadvantaged areas, the aim of the analysis will be to evaluate the degree of convergence 
obtained by these payments with respect to the previous situation and their impact on the regions themselves, on 
the sub-sectors, on individual holdings, etc. In short, the aim will be to answer the question of whether Spain has 
made any progress towards a more equitable system of payments. Another natural continuation of this line of 
research will be to look for viable strategies to boost competitiveness and innovation in the agriculture of the 
different ACs, including the development of new products, processes and technologies, the selection of 
successful experiences and assessing their suitability for implementation in other regions. 
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Notes 
Note 1. Horlings and Marsden (2014) have explored the “New Rural Paradigm” in Europe. 
Note 2. http://www.oecd.org/tad/agricultural-policies/monitoring-and-evaluation.htm 
Note 3. http://www.oecd.org/tad/agricultural-policies/psemanual.htm 
Note 4. http://www.oecd.org/tad/agricultural-policies/producerandconsumersupportestimatesdatabase.htm 
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Note 5. For 2005 and 2006, the value of co-financed development measures were supplied by the Subdirección 
General de Relaciones Internacionales y Asuntos Comunitarios of the MAGRAMA.  
Note 6. From January 1 2007 the classification of agricultural Funds was modified, with the distribution of 
agricultural policy expenditure between the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD).  
Note 7. These actions were mostly related to modernizing holdings and setting up young farmers. 
Note 8. Average annual public spending associated with the priority axes of agricultural interest in the National 
Strategic Reference Framework 2007-2013. 
Note 9. The PRA, SAU, UTA and PIB values were obtained from the National Statistics Institute (INE). 
Note 10. OECD Database 1986-2015 (see footnote 3). 
Note 11. OECD Database 1986-2015 (see footnote 3). 
Note 12. OECD Database 1986-2015 (see footnote 3). 
Note 13. The POSEICAN program in 1991 laid down the legal basis of the Canary Islands relationship with the 
EU due to their remoteness, territorial fragmentation and special economic and fiscal characteristics.  
Note 14. OECD Database 1986-2015 (see footnote 3). 
Note 15. In the EU some products are protected by high customs duties (maximum admissible duties according 
to the agreements with the WTO). These high protection measures are in products such as sugar (mean customs 
duty 129%), meat (67.5%), dairy products (55.9%) and flour (44.4%). In fruit and vegetables a system of entry 
prices is applied that involves additional duties due to European protection from external competition. 
Note 16. See OECD Database 1986-2015. 
Note 17. The other EAFRD Axes are: Axis 2-Improvement of the Environment and the Countryside by means of 
Aids to Land Management; Axis 3-Improvement of Quality of Life in Rural Areas and Promotion of 
Diversification of Economic Activities; Axis 4-LEADER; Axis 5-Technical Assistance. 
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